Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

Chapter 9 poses the question that underlies the whole of Locke's political theory: if man in the state of nature is as free as has been said — if he is absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody — why would he give up any of that freedom and submit to the dominion and control of any other power? The question is not rhetorical; it requires a real answer, and the answer must define what government is for.

Locke's answer identifies three deficiencies of the state of nature that make it, despite its moral order, an uncomfortable long-term condition. First, it lacks an established, settled, known law received and allowed by common consent as the standard of right and wrong. The law of nature is available to reason, but not every person will consult their reason, and those who do may not agree. Second, it lacks a known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences according to established law — every person in the state of nature is judge in their own case, which opens the door to passion, self-interest, and partiality. Third, it often lacks the power to back and support just sentences — those who are wronged may not have force enough to enforce a rightful judgment.

These three deficiencies define what government must provide: a known law, an indifferent judge, and the power of execution. Government exists to remedy exactly these deficiencies — and nothing more. It does not exist to make people virtuous, to advance religion, to enrich the ruler, or to achieve any other purpose beyond the protection of the life, liberty, and estates of its members. This is the source of Locke's constitutionalism: government's powers are limited by its purpose. Any power the government claims beyond the protection of property — in Locke's broad sense of the word, encompassing life and liberty as well as material goods — is a power it does not have.