Of Tyranny

Chapter 18 closes in on tyranny with the precision Locke has been building toward for seventeen chapters. Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right — making use of the force one has not for the good of those over whom it is exercised but for one's own private, separate advantage. It does not matter what form of government the tyrant holds. A monarchist tyranny is the most familiar, but an oligarchy may tyrannize as easily; so may a democratic assembly. The form of government is irrelevant; what matters is whether power is exercised within its purpose or beyond it.

Locke does something unexpected in this chapter: he quotes King James I as corroboration. James had said, in a speech to Parliament, that the difference between a lawful king and a tyrant is that the king makes the good of his people the mark of his government, while the tyrant thinks his kingdom and people are only ordained for the satisfaction of his desires. Locke's point is sharp: the principle that tyranny is illegitimate was acknowledged even by the king whose son would be deposed for it. James II, whose removal had been the occasion of the Glorious Revolution, had violated the principle his father had endorsed.

The practical consequence of tyranny is that it dissolves the obligation of obedience. Where power is exercised beyond right — where the government uses force not for the protection of property but against it — the governed are not bound to submit. They may resist. How far they may resist, and who has the right to judge that the threshold has been reached, is the subject of chapter 19. Chapter 18 simply establishes the principle: a government that uses power for private ends rather than public good has forfeited its claim to obedience, regardless of its constitutional form.