All 19 chapters, from the state of nature to the right of revolution.
The Second Treatise builds a sustained argument from first principles. Chapters 1–4 clear the ground: Filmer is wrong, the state of nature is not war, slavery is not legitimate. Chapters 5–9 construct the positive theory: property, family, society, and the ends of government. Chapters 10–14 describe the structure of legitimate government: forms, legislative limits, executive, federative, and prerogative powers. Chapters 15–18 distinguish legitimate authority from its counterfeits — paternal, despotical, conquest, usurpation, and tyranny. Chapter 19 is the payoff: when government dissolves itself and the right of revolution falls back to the people.
Filmer refuted, the state of nature established, slavery distinguished from legitimate authority.
A short bridge from the First Treatise. Locke summarizes his demolition of Filmer's divine-right theory — Adam gave no kings their authority — and announces that he will now build the positive theory of legitimate government in its place.
The foundation: all men are naturally free, equal, and governed by the law of reason. Locke distinguishes the state of nature — peaceful and morally ordered — from the state of war. Every person has the executive power to enforce the law of nature against violators.
A declaration of intent to take another's life constitutes a state of war. This state is distinct from the state of nature — peaceful unless violated. Even a thief who uses force without threatening life has declared war. Avoiding this is why men form governments.
Natural liberty means freedom from any superior earthly power. No one can consent to their own enslavement, because life and liberty are not alienable. Slavery is the continuation of a state of war — not a compact, not a legitimate institution.
Property from labour, family and society, and the ends of government.
Self-ownership generates ownership of one's labour; labour generates property in whatever it is mixed with. Two limits apply: leave enough for others, take no more than you can use. Money dissolves the spoilage limit and explains unequal accumulation.
Parental authority exists only until reason matures; it is temporary, conditional, aimed at the child's good. It is shared equally between mother and father. It is entirely unlike political power — Filmer's equation of the two is the source of his error.
Political society is defined by the surrender of natural executive power to a common judge. Conjugal society, family, and servant relations are all distinct from it. Absolute monarchy, lacking a common judge over both ruler and subject, is no form of civil government.
Where is the historical evidence of consent? Locke cites historical examples and distinguishes express from tacit consent. Enjoying the benefits of a political community constitutes tacit consent. Once a society is formed, the majority must govern — otherwise the compact is void.
Men give up natural freedom to remedy three deficiencies of the state of nature: no established law, no indifferent judge, no enforcement power. Government exists to provide exactly these — and nothing more. Its purpose defines its limits.
Forms of commonwealth, legislative limits, executive, federative, and prerogative powers.
The majority may place legislative power in the whole community, a few, or one person — creating democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. Locke is neutral among these forms. "Commonwealth" means any independent political community, not democracy specifically.
Four constitutional limits on the legislative: only standing laws, no arbitrary decrees; no taxation without consent; no transfer of legislative authority; no person outside the law's protection. These limits follow from the purpose government was instituted to serve.
Three powers: legislative (makes laws), executive (enforces them constantly), federative (manages foreign relations — war, peace, treaties). Executive and federative are naturally combined but conceptually distinct. This is Locke's separation of powers.
The legislative is supreme; the executive is subordinate and accountable. When the executive overreaches or prevents the legislative from meeting, the people may judge. The appeal of last resort — when all else fails — is to heaven: force.
Prerogative is executive power to act for the public good without — and sometimes against — the letter of the law. It is necessary in emergencies, dangerous when abused. Every explicit legal limit on prerogative is a gain for the people. The ultimate check is the people's judgment.
Paternal, despotical, conquest, usurpation, and tyranny — authority without right.
Three distinct powers: paternal (natural, temporary, for the child's good), political (by consent, for protection of rights, limited), despotical (absolute, from forfeiture in just war, not from consent). Confusing them is the source of most political error.
Victory in a just war gives power only over those who fought unjustly — not over their families or their property. The conqueror cannot derive legitimate political authority from conquest. The children owe him nothing; the land is not his to take.
Usurpation is the exercise of power to which one has no right — a domestic conquest. Where conquest addresses the seizure of authority from without, usurpation addresses seizure from within. Neither creates any obligation of obedience.
Tyranny is using power for private advantage rather than the public good — a mode of governing, not a form of government. It may occur under any constitution. Wherever it exists, the obligation of obedience dissolves. Resistance is lawful.
When trust is broken, the right of revolution returns to the people.
The longest chapter in the treatise. Government may be dissolved by the legislative (arbitrary rule, corrupted elections, foreign subjection) or the executive (hindering the legislature, abandoning office, acting against the laws). In each case, the government dissolves itself — and the right to form a new one returns to the people.