Chapter 1
The ground cleared
Chapter 1 is a bridge from the First Treatise to the Second. Locke summarizes what he has established: that Adam had no such authority over his children or dominion over the world as Filmer claimed; that even if he had, his heirs had no right to it; that even if they did, it could never be determined who was the rightful heir among all the races of mankind. Having demolished Filmer's foundation, Locke is now free to ask what legitimate government actually looks like — which is the project of the remaining eighteen chapters. The chapter is short, but without it the reader doesn't know what the argument is against.
Chapter 2
The state of nature
Chapter 2 is the foundation of everything. Locke establishes that the natural state of mankind is one of perfect freedom and equality — no one is naturally subordinate to another — governed by the law of nature, which is reason. Men have the right and duty to enforce this law against violators: the executive power of the law of nature. Because the state of nature is already morally ordered, the social contract is not a desperate bargain but a considered choice. This chapter also draws the crucial distinction between the state of nature and the state of war — a distinction Hobbes had collapsed, and which Locke's whole anti-absolutist argument depends on.
Chapter 3
The state of war distinguished
Chapter 3 defines the state of war: a state of enmity and destruction, entered when anyone declares — by word or action — a settled intention upon another's life. This state may exist between persons even within a political community, and it does not end simply because a society exists. Crucially, Locke argues that a thief who uses force to take your goods has put himself in a state of war with you, even if he has not hurt you — which makes it lawful to resist him with lethal force. The chapter also explains why avoiding the state of war is one of the great reasons men form political societies.
Chapter 4
Slavery and liberty
Chapter 4 is short but precise. Natural liberty is freedom from any superior earthly power, governed only by the law of nature. Civil liberty is freedom within the bounds of standing law. A person cannot consent to their own enslavement because no one may contract away their own preservation — the right to life is not alienable. Slavery is therefore the continuation of the state of war under another name: the conqueror holds the captive in a state of war rather than executing them immediately. If a compact ever enters between them, the state of war and the slavery it constitutes are both terminated.
Chapter 5
The labour theory of property
Chapter 5 is the heart of the Second Treatise for economic and political theory. Locke argues from self-ownership to the ownership of one's labour, and from labour to property in whatever one mixes that labour with. Two limits constrain acquisition: the sufficiency proviso (enough and as good left for others) and the spoilage proviso (take only what you can use before it perishes). Then Locke introduces money — durable, non-perishable, agreed to by tacit consent — which dissolves the spoilage limit and explains the historical origin of unequal property holdings. Read it twice. The argument is tighter than it first appears.
Chapter 6
Paternal power and its limits
Chapter 6 disentangles parental authority from political authority — one of Locke's most important moves against Filmer. Parents have a temporary jurisdiction over children, justified by children's lack of reason and aimed at the child's good. As reason matures, authority ends. The law that governs humans is the law of reason; once someone can understand that law, they are no longer subject to a parent's direction. Locke also addresses why the mother shares parental power equally — which immediately collapses Filmer's patriarchal model — and why this power cannot be the model for political government.
Chapter 7
From family to political society
Chapter 7 defines political society precisely by distinguishing it from other forms of association. A conjugal society is formed by voluntary compact between man and woman; a family adds children and servants; but none of these is a political society, because none involves the giving up of the natural executive power — the right to punish violations of the law of nature — to a common authority. Where there is no such common authority, no appeal but to heaven, there is no political society. Where there is, there is. Locke also uses this chapter to show why absolute monarchy is no form of civil government at all.
Chapter 8
Consent and the founding of societies
Chapter 8 is the longest in the middle section of the treatise and addresses the most obvious objection to the consent theory: there is no historical record of men meeting and agreeing to form societies. Locke answers with historical examples (pre-conquest Rome, ancient Israel, early English kings) and with the distinction between express and tacit consent. Tacit consent — given by enjoying the benefits of life under the laws — binds a person for as long as they remain within the jurisdiction. The chapter also argues for majority rule: once a society is formed, the majority must govern, or the compact fails.
Chapter 9
Why men form governments
Chapter 9 asks the central instrumental question: if men are already free and equal in the state of nature, why do they submit to government? Locke's answer is that the state of nature, despite its moral order, has three great deficiencies: there is no established law known by common consent; there is no known and indifferent judge; there is no power to enforce sentences when they are given. Government exists to remedy these three deficiencies and nothing more. This chapter is the clearest statement of Locke's limited-government theory.
Chapter 10
Forms of government
Chapter 10 is one of the shortest in the treatise — just two paragraphs — but it settles an important terminological and conceptual point. The majority, having formed a society, may place the legislative power in different hands: the whole community (democracy), a select few (oligarchy), one person (monarchy), or mixed combinations. Locke is neutral among these forms: what matters is not the form but whether the legislative genuinely represents the people. He also clarifies what he means by "commonwealth" throughout the treatise — any independent political community, not democracy in particular.
Chapter 11
The limits of the legislative
Chapter 11 is Locke's most direct statement of constitutional limits. The legislative may not rule by arbitrary, extemporary decrees — only by promulgated, standing laws the same for everyone. It may not tax property without the consent of the people or their representatives. It may not transfer legislative authority elsewhere, since the people delegated it specifically. And it may not place anyone outside the protection of the law. These four limits flow from the purpose of government: the protection of property. Any power claimed beyond this purpose is a power the legislative does not have.
Chapter 12
Three powers of government
Chapter 12 is short but significant: Locke distinguishes three powers of government, establishing the framework that Montesquieu will develop and the American founders will enshrine. The legislative makes laws. The executive enforces them — because laws, once made, need constant execution. The federative manages relations with other political communities: war, peace, treaties, alliances. Executive and federative are naturally held by the same person since both require force, but they are conceptually distinct and should be recognized as such.
Chapter 13
Accountability of powers
Chapter 13 works out the hierarchy of powers established in chapter 12. The legislative is supreme because it makes the laws that everyone else must follow. The executive is subordinate and accountable to it. But what happens when the executive abuses prerogative, or when the legislative oversteps its bounds? Locke's answer has two parts: the legislature can remove an abusive executive, and the people can dissolve a legislature that has betrayed them. The last resort — when neither remedy is available — is the appeal to heaven: force, which is the situation of the state of war.
Chapter 14
Prerogative and its dangers
Chapter 14 is Locke's most candid acknowledgment of the tension in his theory. He defines prerogative as the executive power to act for the public good without prescription of law, and sometimes against it. He traces how in the early history of governments, when the legislative was the executive's tool, prerogative expanded. He argues that every narrowing of prerogative by explicit law is a gain for the people, not an encroachment. And the ultimate check on prerogative — when it is abused — is the people's judgment. They have no appeal to earthly power; their appeal is to heaven.
Chapter 15
Three powers compared
Chapter 15 is a summative chapter — Locke has discussed all three powers in earlier chapters and now draws them together for contrast. Paternal power is natural, temporary, aimed at producing the child's capacity for freedom. Political power is given up by consenting adults for the protection of their rights; it is limited and revocable. Despotical power is absolute, arbitrary, and rests on forfeiture rather than consent — the captive in a just war who has forfeited his life is under it. The three are entirely different in origin, scope, and legitimacy. Confusing them is the source of most political errors.
Chapter 16
What conquest cannot do
Chapter 16 is one of Locke's most practically important chapters, addressed to an audience living in the aftermath of the Norman Conquest and the repeated conquests of British history. Even in a just war — where the aggressor was in the wrong — the conqueror's power over the conquered is severely limited. He may hold the aggressors themselves, but their families never consented to their war and owe nothing. He may not take their property, because the wives and children have rights to it. Conquest is not a source of legitimate political authority; it is merely force under another name.
Chapter 17
Usurpation — domestic conquest
Chapter 17 is one of the shortest in the treatise — two paragraphs — but it closes a gap in the argument. Conquest addressed foreign seizures of authority; usurpation addresses domestic ones. The usurper is someone who exercises a power that belongs to someone else — whether by displacing the rightful holder or by exceeding the limits of their own office. Usurpation, unlike tyranny, may involve the right power exercised by the wrong person; tyranny (chapter 18) involves the wrong power exercised by any person. Both are illegitimate. Neither creates any obligation of obedience.
Chapter 18
Tyranny defined
Chapter 18 defines tyranny precisely: it is not a form of government but a mode of governing — using power for private advantage rather than the public good. Locke quotes King James I himself as evidence that even absolute monarchs acknowledged this principle. Tyranny may occur in any constitutional form: a democracy may tyrannize as well as a monarch. The practical consequence is that wherever tyranny is found — wherever power is used beyond its right — the obligation of obedience dissolves, and resistance becomes lawful.
Chapter 19
The right of revolution
Chapter 19 is the longest and most carefully constructed chapter in the Second Treatise, and the one that made the book dangerous. Locke distinguishes the dissolution of society from the dissolution of government. He catalogues the specific acts that dissolve government — by the legislative and by the executive — and argues that in each case the government has forfeited itself, not the people. He meets the objection that this doctrine invites perpetual rebellion: men are slow to revolt; they tolerate much before acting; and when a long train of abuses makes a deliberate design visible, they are right to act. Compare the Declaration of Independence, 1776.