Of the Beginning of Political Societies

Chapter 8 takes the consent theory directly to its biggest empirical difficulty. Critics asked: if government requires the consent of all members, where in history is there any record of people actually meeting and agreeing to form a society? Locke addresses the objection not by denying it but by reframing it. Men have rarely needed to meet and formally agree, because in the early history of societies — when communities were small and family-based — the consent was continuous, informal, and habitual. Historical examples abound: the founding of Rome, the early kingdoms of England, the governance of Israel before the monarchy. In each case, Locke traces the authority of the governing body back to something recognizable as consent.

The more important move in chapter 8 is the distinction between express and tacit consent. Express consent is given explicitly — by oath, by naturalization, by formal entry into a political compact. Tacit consent is given by anyone who enjoys the benefits of life under a political community's laws — who owns property within its jurisdiction, travels on its roads, trades in its markets. Such a person, by enjoying these benefits, implicitly consents to the laws that make them possible, and is bound by them for as long as they remain within the territory. The doctrine of tacit consent is Locke's answer to the problem of political obligation for those who were never asked to sign anything.

Chapter 8 also establishes the principle of majority rule. Once a political society is formed, it must be able to act as a body — which means it must be able to reach decisions. The only practicable rule is majority rule: the greater part must conclude for the rest, or the body cannot move at all. Locke defends majority rule not as the ideal outcome but as the necessary mechanics of a body politic; unanimity is impossible in any significant community, so the majority must determine. From this premise the structure of representative government follows naturally.