Book 2, Chapter 6 — Law

Rousseau begins by noting that without legislation, the body politic has existence but no direction — it is alive but has no will. The social compact gives the community life; legislation gives it movement. He then sets up the definition by asking what law is not. A decree can be general in will but particular in object: the Sovereign can will something for a specific person, but that will is not thereby general. A decree can be particular in will: a single magistrate can decree for all, but that will is not the Sovereign's. Law requires both: a general will issuing a general decree — the whole people, addressing the whole people, on matters that concern them as a whole.

The practical test is whether names appear. A law may establish the office of king and its rules of succession; it may not name a particular king or designate a royal family. A law may create classes of citizens and specify qualifications; it may not assign a specific person to any class. A law may establish privileges; it may not confer a specific privilege on a specific person by name. Every act that names an individual — even a legislative act — is an act of government, not legislation. The parliament that decrees about a named individual is, in that moment, acting as a magistrate, not as a Sovereign.

What makes this more than a formal distinction is its connection to justice. The law's generality is what guarantees its impartiality. When the Sovereign decrees in the abstract — 'whoever does X shall receive Y' — the decree applies equally to all, including to those who make it. No one can tailor a general law to favor themselves without equally favoring everyone who qualifies. Particular decrees, by contrast, can always be shaped to serve specific interests. The generality of law is not merely a formal requirement; it is the mechanism by which the general will produces equal treatment.