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The Federalist Papers

by Hamilton, Madison, Jay (as "Publius")

Eighty-five newspaper essays written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay in 1787-88 to defend the proposed Constitution. The most influential work of political theory in American history — including Madison's celebrated "factions" paper (No. 10), the "if men were angels" argument for checks and balances (No. 51), and Hamilton's case for judicial review (No. 78).

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Chapters
  1. Chapter 1No. 1 — General Introduction (Hamilton)
  2. Chapter 2No. 2 — Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay)
  3. Chapter 3No. 3 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) (Jay)
  4. Chapter 4No. 4 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) (Jay)
  5. Chapter 5No. 5 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) (Jay)
  6. Chapter 6No. 6 — Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (Hamilton)
  7. Chapter 7No. 7 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) (Hamilton)
  8. Chapter 8No. 8 — The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States (Hamilton)
  9. Chapter 9No. 9 — The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Hamilton)
  10. Chapter 10No. 10 — The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) (Madison)
  11. Chapter 11No. 11 — The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy (Hamilton)
  12. Chapter 12No. 12 — The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue (Hamilton)
  13. Chapter 13No. 13 — Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government (Hamilton)
  14. Chapter 14No. 14 — Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered (Madison)
  15. Chapter 15No. 15 — The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton)
  16. Chapter 16No. 16 — The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Hamilton)
  17. Chapter 17No. 17 — The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Hamilton)
  18. Chapter 18No. 18 — The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the New York Packet. Friday, (Hamilton & Madison)
  19. Chapter 19No. 19 — The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Hamilton & Madison)
  20. Chapter 20No. 20 — The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Hamilton & Madison)
  21. Chapter 21No. 21 — Other Defects of the Present Confederation (Hamilton)
  22. Chapter 22No. 22 — The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) (Hamilton)
  23. Chapter 23No. 23 — The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union (Hamilton)
  24. Chapter 24No. 24 — The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (Hamilton)
  25. Chapter 25No. 25 — The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) (Hamilton)
  26. Chapter 26No. 26 — The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered. (Hamilton)
  27. Chapter 27No. 27 — The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) (Hamilton)
  28. Chapter 28No. 28 — The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) (Hamilton)
  29. Chapter 29No. 29 — Concerning the Militia (Hamilton)
  30. Chapter 30No. 30 — Concerning the General Power of Taxation (Hamilton)
  31. Chapter 31No. 31 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
  32. Chapter 32No. 32 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
  33. Chapter 33No. 33 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
  34. Chapter 34No. 34 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
  35. Chapter 35No. 35 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
  36. Chapter 36No. 36 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
  37. Chapter 37No. 37 — Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government. (Madison)
  38. Chapter 38No. 38 — The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed. (Madison)
  39. Chapter 39No. 39 — The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles (Madison)
  40. Chapter 40No. 40 — On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained For the New York Packet. Friday, January 18, 1788. (Madison)
  41. Chapter 41No. 41 — General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution (Madison)
  42. Chapter 42No. 42 — The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (Madison)
  43. Chapter 43No. 43 — The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) (Madison)
  44. Chapter 44No. 44 — Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States (Madison)
  45. Chapter 45No. 45 — The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments. Considered For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 26, 1788 (Madison)
  46. Chapter 46No. 46 — The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared (Madison)
  47. Chapter 47No. 47 — The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts. (Madison)
  48. Chapter 48No. 48 — These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other. (Madison)
  49. Chapter 49No. 49 — Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention. (Madison)
  50. Chapter 50No. 50 — Periodical Appeals to the People Considered (Madison)
  51. Chapter 51No. 51 — The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments. (Madison)
  52. Chapter 52No. 52 — The House of Representatives (Madison)
  53. Chapter 53No. 53 — The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) (Madison)
  54. Chapter 54No. 54 — The Apportionment of Members Among the States (Madison)
  55. Chapter 55No. 55 — The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Madison)
  56. Chapter 56No. 56 — The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) (Madison)
  57. Chapter 57No. 57 — The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation. (Madison)
  58. Chapter 58No. 58 — Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands. Considered For the Independent Journal Wednesday, February 20, 1788. (Madison)
  59. Chapter 59No. 59 — Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Hamilton)
  60. Chapter 60No. 60 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) (Hamilton)
  61. Chapter 61No. 61 — The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) (Hamilton)
  62. Chapter 62No. 62 — The Senate (Madison)
  63. Chapter 63No. 63 — The Senate Continued (Madison)
  64. Chapter 64No. 64 — The Powers of the Senate (Jay)
  65. Chapter 65No. 65 — The Powers of the Senate Continued (Hamilton)
  66. Chapter 66No. 66 — Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered. (Hamilton)
  67. Chapter 67No. 67 — The Executive Department (Hamilton)
  68. Chapter 68No. 68 — The Mode of Electing the President (Hamilton)
  69. Chapter 69No. 69 — The Real Character of the Executive (Hamilton)
  70. Chapter 70No. 70 — The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)
  71. Chapter 71No. 71 — The Duration in Office of the Executive (Hamilton)
  72. Chapter 72No. 72 — The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered. (Hamilton)
  73. Chapter 73No. 73 — The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power (Hamilton)
  74. Chapter 74No. 74 — The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive. (Hamilton)
  75. Chapter 75No. 75 — The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
  76. Chapter 76No. 76 — The Appointing Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
  77. Chapter 77No. 77 — The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered. (Hamilton)
  78. Chapter 78No. 78 — The Judiciary Department (Hamilton)
  79. Chapter 79No. 79 — The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
  80. Chapter 80No. 80 — The Powers of the Judiciary (Hamilton)
  81. Chapter 81No. 81 — The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority. (Hamilton)
  82. Chapter 82No. 82 — The Judiciary Continued. (Hamilton)
  83. Chapter 83No. 83 — The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury (Hamilton)
  84. Chapter 84No. 84 — Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered. (Hamilton)
  85. Chapter 85No. 85 — Concluding Remarks (Hamilton)

No. 1 — General Introduction (Hamilton)

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose...